Learning from experience within the Norwegian Army. Comparison of learning processes during the operations in Afghanistan (2005-2012) and the exercise Trident Juncture (2018).

Both NATO and the Norwegian Government consider it of crucial importance for armed forces to actively learn from experiences, gained during operations and exercises. The armed forces that are able to effectively learn quickest will have a significant advantage over their opponent(s). This thesis identifies and explains differences and similarities in the processes used by the Norwegian Army to learn from experiences during its operations in Afghanistan in the period from 2005 until 2012 and during the exercise Trident Juncture in 2018. The comparison of the two cases is based on an analysis of previous research, related to the Afghanistan period, on a series of interviews with personnel throughout the Norwegian Armed Forces’ and Army’s hierarchies and on a study of relevant orders and documents. In both cases, there was no organisation-wide lessons learned process present within the Army that was specific or detailed enough to be used throughout the whole of the organisation. However, case-by-case guidance initiated at the level of the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and tailor-made to the operation or to the exercise, was issued. Generally, this guidance was quite effective but there were differences in its reach. In Trident Juncture, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters used the peacetime chain of command, involving also the Norwegian Army Command and Brigade North. In the Afghanistan period, using the mission chain of command, guidance was given directly to the battalion level. Subsequently, the involvement of the Army Command and Brigade North in those lessons learned processes was significantly less. Furthermore, it proved to be challenging to compare previously identified lessons with new lessons, predominantly because a usable (database-) system to support such analysis was lacking. Finally, committing personnel to lessons learned processes, either on a dedicated position or as an appointed officer with primary responsibility besides the regular job, enhanced the conduct of lessons learned processes noticeably. Improving knowledge of lessons learned processes throughout the Army’s hierarchy could further enhance the formalisation, and with that the capability, of learning from experience