Dagens juridiske rammeverk for utbyggingsavtaler og utfordringene det medfører for aktørene i Oslo

This thesis investigates how the legal regulations for development agreements works for property developers and the authorities in Oslo. Further, it’s investigated how the practice has adapted within these regulations. It’s also discussed how a ‘fixed-price-model’ can affect the challenges developers and authorities have with today’s legal regulations. Development agreements are agreements between developers and the planning authority, the purpose is to develop in according to a pre-approved zoning plan. The development agreements are thus an agreement to secure development in according to the plan. Today's model for development agreements in Oslo can be divided into two types of areas; areas with the need for joint planning, and areas without the need for joint planning. In both cases, the content of a development agreement is strongly correlated with the infrastructure measures from the zoning plan. The interviewees therefore experienced that the development agreement itself is a less important tool that only clarifies who will build what infrastructure. For this reason, the development agreements are seen in the context of the area plans and the zoning plans. The interviewees experienced that the current model is unpredictable in areas without the need for joint planning. An individual assessment is made of each project, and the developers may feel lucky or unlucky with the total contribution they must make. In these areas, it is mainly the developer who builds the infrastructure. In areas with the need for joint planning the authorities in Oslo have developed several models to ensure comprehensive planning of the infrastructure. In this thesis we have found that the developers and authorities in Oslo perceive the legal framework as inflexible and efficient. For this reason, plans outside of the legal system has been developed, such as "Veiledende prinsipplan for det offentlige rom" and "Tiltaksliste for offentlige rom”. The measures in these plans form the basis for the content of development agreements through the zoning plans. In these areas we found that the amount developers need to contribute to infrastructure is relatively fixed, which gives the developers better predictability. All the interviewees thought these plans worked well in practice. In some areas with the need for joint planning, the landowners themselves have to plan the infrastructure together. This is due to lack of capacity with the planning authorities. In this thesis we found that this model works poorly. The thesis identifies seven challenges that developers and authorities in Oslo have with today’s legal framework. This was necessary see how a ‘fixed price-model’ could affect these challenges. 1. The actual infrastructure is rarely negotiated in the actual development agreement. 2. The distribution of power in the negotiation is skewed. 3. The legal framework hasn’t been tested in a court of law. 4. Lack of efficiency and flexibility in the legal framework. 5. It’s coincidental which of the projects in an area needs to have a kindergarten in the zoning plan. 6. Low capacity for construction at the Agency for Urban Environment. 7. Low capacity for planning at the Agency for Planning and Building Services. Some of these challenges are solved through the different models that have been developed outside of the legal planning tools, but there are still some challenges that is hard to solve with today’s legal regulations. The thesis looked at how a legislative amendment, which facilitates a ‘fixed-price-model’, can affect these challenges. The model is based on the Sandnes-model, which means that developers pay a fixed amount per square meter, which the planning authorities then use to construct infrastructure. It was concluded that such a model could ease some of the identified challenges, but that new challenges would probably emerge. Thus, such a model must be investigated more with several interviewees and a larger geographical scope