A community changes: Taiwan's council of Grand justices and liberal democratic reform

In contrast to many of the other societies examined in this book, Taiwan has, over the last decade, been dismantling its authoritarian political structure. This process has had a major impact on judicial decision-making. In this chapter, I examine this impact with an account of the Council of Grand Justices, the de facto constitutional court in Taiwan.1 I first provide a description of the constitution in Taiwan and the role of the Council, and then contrast the approach of the Council to constitutional issues before and after the democratisation process. Finally, I seek to place this development in a theoretical context. I cast doubt on whether Jayasuriya’s ‘East Asian judicial condition’ model (Jayasuriya’s ‘Introduction’, this volume) can be applied to Taiwan. I also reject an analysis based on the ideal of ‘judicial independence’. I offer instead, an interpretation of the Taiwan experience based on an understanding of the relationship between judges and the ‘political-legal community’ with whom they interact.