Ustavni monizem in krčenje referendumskega odločanja

Namen tega prispevka je opozoriti na pravno-tehnične šibkosti argumentacije slovenskega ustavnega sodišča pri t. i. doktrini zlorabe referenduma. Očitno je ustavno sodišče v preveliki vnemi uresničiti svojo odločbo prekoračilo ustavne okvire sistema delitve oblasti in tako spodkopalo razmerja med ustavnimi akterji v sistemu zavor in ravnovesij. »Policy« analiza namreč pokaže, da se je tehtnica pri tem nagnila preveč v smer vsakokratne parlamentarne večine, ki sedaj lahko laže odstrani ovire na poti do uresničitve svojih političnih interesov. Slednje lahko na dolgi rok, in nekatera znamenja kažejo na to že sedaj, privede do ustavnega monizma, ki je nasprotje ustavnega pluralizma, v katerem raznoliki politični in drugi interesi tekmujejo med seboj po pravilih političnega diskurza, utemeljenega na priznavanju enakih diskusijskih možnosti in na pripravljenosti za sklepanje kompromisov, utemeljenih na načelih solidarnosti in ustavne strpnosti. Vloga instituta referenduma kot pravice veta, oz. zavore za ustvarjanje ravnovesja, je izjemnega pomena, zato ustavno sodišče odločanja o njegovem omejevanju ne bi smelo puščati v rokah političnega diskurza in tekmujočih političnih sil, ampak bi moralo zanj poskrbeti samo v skladu s pravili pravnega diskurza, ki jih narekuje obstoječi slovenski ustavni red.The author in his article points to the shortcomings and inconsistencies in the legal reasoning that the Slovenian Constitutional Court employed in the introduction of the so called doctrine of the abuse of referendum. The Constitutional Court has in a desire to see its judgements enforced apparently overreacted and transgressed the constitutional boundaries of the principle of separation of powers, which consequently undermined the equilibrium among the constitutional actors within the system of checks and balances. The policy analysis, which the author predominantly relies on in his article, demonstrates that the Constitutional Court has thus moved the scale too much in favour of the parliamentary majority which is now capable to remove the obstacles of in the way to fulfil its political goals even more easily. However, the author warns that the distortion of the aforementioned equilibrium can, in the long term, shift Slovenian conception of constitutional democracy to the ambit of constitutional monism. The latter works at a disadvantage of the constitutional pluralism, which is characterized by the competition of various and diverse political and other interests following the rules of political discourse based on the recognition of equal discussion opportunities and on the readiness for making compromises founded on the principles of solidarity and constitutional tolerance. The author emphasizes the importance of the referendum being the right to veto or the check for the safeguarding of the equilibrium and concludes that Constitutional Court should not have authorized the competing political forces in the parliament to decide whether referendum should be allowed or not in a particular case. This task should be reserved for the Constitutional Court itself to decide according to the rules of the legal discourse as they are laid down within Slovenian constitutional order