Razlagalne odločbe Ustavnega sodišča RS

Za zmedo v dojemanju razlagalnih odločb je po avtorjevem mnenju neposredno krivo ustaljeno poimenovanje, obenem pa tudi tisti argument a fortiori, s katerim se je »razlagalna odločba« v začetku utemeljevala – in se hkrati postavljala v nasprotje z »razveljavitveno odločbo«. Specifika razlagalnih odločb je razlaganje in značilnost razveljavitvenih je razveljavljenje, a to si nujno ne kontrira; to ni diferentia specifica. Obravnavano področje je potrebno določenih teoretičnih pojasnil. Izvorni razlog za ustaljeno poimenovanje in argumentiranje avtor pripiše »samoumevnemu, a nepopolnemu dojemanju zakona« – v njegovem stvarnem ali oblikovnem pomenu zakonskega besedila –, ki pripelje do zaključka: besedilo lahko razveljavim ali razlagam. Avtor »zakon« opredeljuje celoviteje; razčleni ga na tri plasti: na dejansko plast, na stvarno plast in na pomensko plast zakona – plast pravnih pravil. Razlagalne odločbe operirajo na polju pomena (in ne besedila); izpostavljajo plast pravnih pravil (v nasprotju s pravnimi določili). To pa še ničesar ne pove o tem, ali razveljavljajo … ali pa pravo celo ustvarjajo. Nujno je zato tudi novo poimenovanje, ki bi izrecno kazalo na pravno naravo, na učinke posameznih tipov razlagalnih odločb. Tipološke ureditve razlagalnih odločb se avtor loteva v drugem delu. Na podlagi vzorčnih jezikovnih obrazcev izreka pa nato ponuja novo nomenklaturo. Predlaga dvojno poimenovanje, s katerim opozarja na razliko med plastjo zakona, na kateri ustavno sodišče deluje, in posledicami, ki jih ima lahko taka ali drugačna jezikovna formulacija izreka za pravni red. Razveljavitvenim razlagalnim odločbam radikalno priznava celo izrecno ustavno podlago. Kot najprimernejšega izpostavlja vzorčni jezikovni obrazec izreka, ki se glasi: »(Izpodbijani zakon ali prav no določilo) ni v neskladju z Ustavo, če se ne razlaga tako, da (sledi ustavi nasprotujoča razlaga).« Ustvarjalnim razlagalnim odločbam ne pripiše neustavnosti, zatrdi pa, da vzpostavljajo neprimeren dialog ustavnega sodišča z zakonodajno in sodno vejo oblasti; razmerje, ki predvsem škoduje samemu ustavnemu sodišču. Pri ugotovitvenih razlagalnih odločbah, ki so najpogostejše in prav tako po vsem ustavne, pa primernost spet ni odvisna od njihove razlagalne narave, ampak od jezikovne oblike izreka, s katerim udejanjajo tak ali drugačen odnos … in učinek na pravni red.Interpretation of statutes is common to legislator, ordinary courts, and a constitutional court, therefore arising conflicts in this field do not surprise. Authoritative interpretation of statutes in interpretive decisions of the Constitutional Cou rt (C.C.) constitutes the object of this work given the fact it builds special relations of power between the C.C. and the legislative or the judicial branch. The author focuses on those arguments that provokes popular judgements on the constitutionality of the interpretive technique. The following questions popup: Whether C.C.’s interpreting action remains inside the margins of its constitutional jurisdiction or does it fall out? – Do these interpretive decisions interfere with legislative action of the Parliament or decision-making process of the ordinary courts? – Is it constitutional and is it appropriate? The author claims theoretical foundations of interpretive decisions in the very nature of the constitutional decision-making and the practical ones in demands of legal order of which he surprisingly underlines fair-play in the constitutional game where the legislature and the courts take part as well. On the basis of some theoretical elucidations that permit the author to redefine term “statute” giving him a triple sense (legislative action, legal text, and legal norms as signification of legal dispositions) – he states: “To mark a decision as interpretative does not tell a thing about its appropriateness either its constitutionality. It only says that the decision exposes the signifying level of a statute (and not the textual one); that the level exposed is the level of legal norms (and not the one of legal dispositions).” He therefore proposes doubled terminology that would expose the difference between a level of a statute where decision acts and consequences that one or another linguistic formula in the operating part of the decision has for legal order. After typological systemization of existing interpretive decisions this new nomenclature takes place. Radically, invalidating-interpretive decisions are even confirmed to have explicit constitutional basis. Linguistic pattern of a tenor that would be the most appropriate states: “(Reviewed statute or legal disposition) is not in conflict with the Constitution, when not applied in a way such as (follows the interpretation in conflict with the Constitution).” Constructing-interpretive decisions are not labelled by unconstitutionality, however the author affirms their nuisance for C.C.’s relationship with legislature and the courts; their inappropriate character harms in the first place the authority of the C.C. itself. Again, the appropriateness of declaring-interpretive decisions (most commonly used in practice) does not depend on their interpretative nature but on the operating parts’ linguistic formulation which builds one or another kind of relations … and effects on legal order