Uklonljivost, vrednostne praznine in razlaganje

V tem članku avtor poveže pojma »vrednostne praznine« in »uklonljivost norm« z realističnim naukom o pravnem razlaganju. Poda tri primere, s pomočjo katerih prikaže postopek uklanjanja norm in ustvarjanja vrednostnih praznin. V postopku razlaganja razlagalec najprej napravi vrednostno sodbo, da določba, v skladu s črkobralsko razlago, ureja primere, ki jih ne bi smela. Nadaljuje z zožujočo razlago sporne določbe. S tem, ko razdruži dve skupini dejanskih stanj v normo vnese tiho izjemo. Na ta način normo ukloni, tj. delno jo razveljavi. Z nečrkobralsko razlago tako ustvari (vrednostno) praznino, ki jo mora nato zapolniti z novo normo doktrinarnega izvora. Avtor pokaže, da – tako kot lepota ni v samih stvareh, temveč v očeh gledalca – uklonljivost in vrednostne praznine niso objektivne značilnosti pravnega reda ali norm in da ne obstajajo pred razlaganjem, temveč so šele njen rezultat.In this article, the author connects the concept of “axiological gap” and that of “defeasibility of norms” with the “realist” theory of legal interpretation. He gives three examples through which he demonstrates the process of defeating a norm and creating an axiological gap. In the process of interpretation, an interpreter first makes a value judgment that a normative disposition on its literal interpretation regulates cases it shouldn’t. Then he proceeds by making a restrictive interpretation of the normative disposition in question. Distinguishing two classes of states of affairs, he introduces into the norm an implicit exception. This way he defeats the norm, i.e. he derogates it. With a non-literal interpretation he thus creates an (axiological) gap, which he must then fill with a new norm of a doctrinal origin. The author demonstrates that - just like the beauty is not in the world, but in the eyes of its interpreters – defeasibility and axiological gaps are not properties of legal orders or norms per se and do not exist prior to, but are rather the result of interpretation