Analogy and Balancing

The goal of the paper is to reply to David Duarte’s critique of the partial reducibility thesis―a claim I defended in one of my books that analogy is partly reducible to the balancing of legal principles. In the first part of the paper I sketch the framework against which the thesis was formulated, i.e. Robert Alexy’s theory of legal reasoning. In the second part I attempt to rebut Duarte’s objections, pointing out that they do not take into account the Alexian background of my considerations. Finally, I suggest that some aspects of my theory of analogical reasoning are independent of its theoretical background and may be of value for any conceptualization of analogy in the law.Analogno sklepanje in tehtanje. Odgovor Davidu Duarteju. Cilj članka je odgovoriti na kritiko, ki jo je David Duarte usmeril zoper tezo o delni zvedljivosti, tj. trditev, ki jo Brożek zagovarja v eni izmed svojih knjig in ki pravi, da je analogno sklepanje deloma zvedljivo na tehtanje pravnih načel. Prvi del članka oriše okvir, ki je avtorju služil pri oblikovanju teze o zvedljivosti, tj. Alexyjevo teorijo pravnega sklepanja. Drugi del je namenjen ovrženju Duartejevih ugovorov. Ti naj namreč ne bi upoštevali prej omenjenega okvira. V zadnjem delu avor še zatrdi, da so nekateri vidiki njegove teorije analognega sklepanja neodvisni od omenjenega teoretskega okvira in zato uporabni za katero koli pojmovanje analogije v pravu