Corporate Governance after Enron and Global Crossing: Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 \u3ci\u3e\u3c/i\u3e 723 (2003)

This Article outlines and compares the corporate governance structures of the United States, Japan, Germany, and France. This outline and comparison is made with respect to past, present, and future characteristics and trends. As a cross-national study, it recognizes that the varying natures of differing legal, business, social, and cultural structures significantly affect the degree to which a country can implement changes to its corporate governance systems. This study includes the possibility that one country\u27s corporate model might be inapplicable to another country. Some aspects of American capitalism, nevertheless, are slowly being adopted as improvements in Germany, France, and Japan. Likewise, the U.S. is importing, to some extent, features of other countries\u27 systems.This Article also analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of corporate governance systems in Japan, Germany, and France. By doing so, a better understanding can be gained of the nature and limitations of America\u27s corporate governance system, its potential for exportation, and its capacity for importing foreign improvements. Likewise, a better grasp can be gained of the nature and limitations of other countries\u27 corporate governance systems, their potentials for exportation, and their capacities for importing foreign improvements. The recent bankruptcies of Enron and Global Crossing are used to illustrate these points