This article seeks to answer a fundamental antitrust question: does crime pay? Do the current overall levels of U.S. cartel sanctions adequately discourage firms from engaging in illegal collusion? Seven years ago our research showed that the unfortunate answer was clearly that, yes, criminal collusion usually is profitable! The expected costs (in terms of criminal fines and prison time, civil damages, etc.) was significantly less than expected gains to the price fixers. Sadly, the most recent data re-affirm this conclusion. The great majority of companies participating in illegal cartels make a profit even after they pay all the penalties. The current level of sanctions is only 9 to 21 percent of optimality, so it follows that current ove...
Based on unique data characterizing private cartel behavior since the 1770s, this dissertation prese...
This Comment was submitted to the US Sentencing Commission on behalf of the American Antitrust Insti...
The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Uni...
This article seeks to answer a fundamental antitrust question: does crime pay? Do the current overa...
This article is the first to analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal. The conventional wisdom i...
This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are s...
This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are s...
none4siThis article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for...
This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistl...
This paper surveys hundreds of published social-science studies of private, hard-core cartels that c...
This article shows the limitations to the optimal deterrence-inspired cartel enforcement policy curr...
This paper presents and analyses economic data on 167 international cartels that were discovered by ...
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schem...
This article shows that private enforcement of the U. S. antitrust laws-which usually is derided as ...
The most significant violation of antitrust law in industrial economics is cartel formation. A price...
Based on unique data characterizing private cartel behavior since the 1770s, this dissertation prese...
This Comment was submitted to the US Sentencing Commission on behalf of the American Antitrust Insti...
The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Uni...
This article seeks to answer a fundamental antitrust question: does crime pay? Do the current overa...
This article is the first to analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal. The conventional wisdom i...
This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are s...
This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are s...
none4siThis article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for...
This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistl...
This paper surveys hundreds of published social-science studies of private, hard-core cartels that c...
This article shows the limitations to the optimal deterrence-inspired cartel enforcement policy curr...
This paper presents and analyses economic data on 167 international cartels that were discovered by ...
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schem...
This article shows that private enforcement of the U. S. antitrust laws-which usually is derided as ...
The most significant violation of antitrust law in industrial economics is cartel formation. A price...
Based on unique data characterizing private cartel behavior since the 1770s, this dissertation prese...
This Comment was submitted to the US Sentencing Commission on behalf of the American Antitrust Insti...
The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Uni...