Investigations into the recent financial crisis have found that banking regulators knew or should have known of many of the problems that would ultimately cripple the finance industry. We argue that their failure to address those problems prior to the crisis was at least partly due to misaligned incentives for bank examiners that encourage inadequate inspection and forbearance and discourage the curbing of ill-advised risk taking. We recommend changing examiners’ incentives to better align them with the public good. Specifically, banking regulators should be “paid for performance” — rewarded for nurturing long-term health for the banks they oversee as well as well-timed decisions to seize control of failing banks
We show that market discipline can be effective in resolving the moral hazard problem which arises w...
According to a common narrative, the failure of banks in the financial crisis reflected poor corpora...
Why do good bankers sometimes respond with the same disastrous strategies? Rooted in regulatory econ...
Investigations into the recent financial crisis have found that banking regulators knew or should ha...
Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks tha...
In the years before the Financial Crisis, banks got to pick their regulators, engaging in a form of ...
In the wake of the Great Recession, regulators pledged to rectify the imbalances, loopholes, and ine...
We study regulation, executive incentives and risk taking in banks during the recent credit crises. ...
In response to the difficulties facing the nation’s leading financial institutions after the 2008 ec...
Within the financial services sector of the U.S. economy, commercial banking and insurance have broa...
Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the finan...
In the present climate of intense debate over deposit insurance reform, the nature and limits of mar...
Banks and credit unions sometimes complain that the examination process regulators use to police ban...
Due to principal-agency frictions, firms tend to engage in moral hazard behaviour. The banking indus...
In the wake of recent studies concluding that financial markets effectively demand risk premia on no...
We show that market discipline can be effective in resolving the moral hazard problem which arises w...
According to a common narrative, the failure of banks in the financial crisis reflected poor corpora...
Why do good bankers sometimes respond with the same disastrous strategies? Rooted in regulatory econ...
Investigations into the recent financial crisis have found that banking regulators knew or should ha...
Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks tha...
In the years before the Financial Crisis, banks got to pick their regulators, engaging in a form of ...
In the wake of the Great Recession, regulators pledged to rectify the imbalances, loopholes, and ine...
We study regulation, executive incentives and risk taking in banks during the recent credit crises. ...
In response to the difficulties facing the nation’s leading financial institutions after the 2008 ec...
Within the financial services sector of the U.S. economy, commercial banking and insurance have broa...
Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the finan...
In the present climate of intense debate over deposit insurance reform, the nature and limits of mar...
Banks and credit unions sometimes complain that the examination process regulators use to police ban...
Due to principal-agency frictions, firms tend to engage in moral hazard behaviour. The banking indus...
In the wake of recent studies concluding that financial markets effectively demand risk premia on no...
We show that market discipline can be effective in resolving the moral hazard problem which arises w...
According to a common narrative, the failure of banks in the financial crisis reflected poor corpora...
Why do good bankers sometimes respond with the same disastrous strategies? Rooted in regulatory econ...