Baby Jane Doe: Stating a Cause of Action against the Officious Intermeddler

Parents of profoundly impaired neonates often face agonizing decisions regarding the exploitation of medical technologies that may prolong their child\u27s existence but not be able to promise the child a normal life. Some pro-life advocates have attempted to intervene in that parental decision by resorting to litigation to compel life-sustaining treatment in particular cases. Although many find such officious intermeddling offensive, legal condemnation is uncertain. This Article argues that the second Restatement of Torts\u27 formulation of the invasion of privacy tort is flexible enough to support a privacy action by the parents against officious intermeddlers. It first reviews the recent Baby Jane Doe litigation to illustrate a typical instance of officious intermeddling. It next argues that a privacy action on the infant\u27s behalf would fail. Finally, it explores the efficacy of a privacy action on the parents\u27 behalf, concluding that such an action is appropriate despite a dearth of precise precedent and that available defenses would not exonerate the officious intermeddler