Add to ORKGThe standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent. We depart from this assumption by allowing policymakers to be influenced by the rent-seeking behavior of businesses. Campaign contributions may affect tax competition and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. Based on a panel of 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, we find that contributions have a significant direct effect on tax policy, the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution is nearly $4, the slope of the tax reaction function is negative, and the empirical results are sensitive to state effects
I analyze how competition between localities affects tax breaks and business location decisions. I f...
American states and localities levy several taxes on business capital. Vertical tax competition aris...
The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that estimates tax reaction functions of gov...
The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly b...
The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymak-ers are perfectly ...
The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly b...
State and local governments forfeit over $80 billion in tax revenue each year in order to incentiviz...
Lowering state-level business taxes has been shown to have no effect on the state economy. Yet while...
This paper analyzes tax competition between politically-motivated governments in a world economy wit...
<p>This paper studies tax competition between two asymmetrical countries for an oligopolistic indust...
The American states and their constituent local governments each levy taxes on mobile business capit...
The exhaustive existing literature on sales tax competition has had a focus on state data or case-st...
Evidence outside the tax arena suggests that firms earn rents in the presence of agglomerations, whi...
The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that estimates tax reaction functions of gov...
State fiscal policy frequently focuses on stimulating a healthy business environment with the assump...
I analyze how competition between localities affects tax breaks and business location decisions. I f...
American states and localities levy several taxes on business capital. Vertical tax competition aris...
The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that estimates tax reaction functions of gov...
The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly b...
The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymak-ers are perfectly ...
The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly b...
State and local governments forfeit over $80 billion in tax revenue each year in order to incentiviz...
Lowering state-level business taxes has been shown to have no effect on the state economy. Yet while...
This paper analyzes tax competition between politically-motivated governments in a world economy wit...
<p>This paper studies tax competition between two asymmetrical countries for an oligopolistic indust...
The American states and their constituent local governments each levy taxes on mobile business capit...
The exhaustive existing literature on sales tax competition has had a focus on state data or case-st...
Evidence outside the tax arena suggests that firms earn rents in the presence of agglomerations, whi...
The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that estimates tax reaction functions of gov...
State fiscal policy frequently focuses on stimulating a healthy business environment with the assump...
I analyze how competition between localities affects tax breaks and business location decisions. I f...
American states and localities levy several taxes on business capital. Vertical tax competition aris...
The paper contributes to a small but growing literature that estimates tax reaction functions of gov...