El problema de la referencia de los conceptos teóricos

This paper is an analysis of the problem raised by our use of theoretical terms to refer to unobservable entities. I follow the approach taken by Hacking (1983), Harré (1986), and Shapere (1979) where the scientific enterprise is understood as a mixture of material and cognitive practices, and emphasis is laid on our capacity to manipulate nature. I make a critical analysis of the ideas presented by Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1973,1975), according to whom the referent of a term is that entity which satisfies the description given by the speaker. I distinguish between the meaning, denotation, and act of reference performed by the speaker, and argue that reference can be maintained through different conceptual systems as long as the ontological component of denotation is maintained by the speaker. The general point of the paper is that we need to shift from semantics to ontology, and from words to people' praxis in order to clarify many issues regarding reference