Resource rent in aquaculture

Resource rent in aquaculture (RRA) is any payment to a farm and site owner, on land or sea, in excess of the costs needed to bring that farm into production. For analytic and policy purposes it may be useful to distinguish among different types of RRA. Three types will be discussed: rent associated with the classical economists Ricardo (1821) and Faustmann (1849), as well as oligopoly rent from access regulation (licensing) and hampered output. The latter can arise in the case of downward sloping demand for a particular type of seafood from an aquaculture country. The similarities and differences among these types of rent are discussed and the distinctions between business economics indicators and RRA are clarified. The theory is applied to the case of Atlantic salmon in Norway and white leg shrimp in Vietnam. Based on cost and revenue data for 2016 from 84 firms from the Directorate of Fisheries in Norway; and for 2014 from 318 farms and for 2016 for 120 farms from two surveys in Vietnam, both business economics and RRA indicators are calculated, after revealing the cost structure of the farms. In theory, the RRA rate may be higher or lower than the profit rate, depending on the capital structure and intensity of the firms. The analysis demonstrates very high profit and rent margins in the Norwegian salmon industry, and lower, but positive ones in Vietnam. However, the profit and rent rates are much higher in Vietnam due to the low capital intensity of the shrimp industry