Young children\u27s understanding of deception: A key to their theory of mind

A theory of mind is a naive understanding of: the types of things that constitute the mind, in other words, mental states like intentions, beliefs, motives, and emotions; the relation between mental states and the real world; and the relation between mental states and behavior. Preschoolers resemble adults in some of these understandings, but not in others. An analysis of the components of successful deception was used to look more systematically at preschoolers\u27 theory of mind. One component that may present problems for 3- and 4-year-olds is the understanding that people can believe something that\u27s not true (infallibility account). Evidence that is used to support this claim can alternatively be interpreted as showing that children don\u27t understand how anyone could believe something that contradicts what they themselves now believe (egocentrism account). A standard false belief task was modified to distinguish between these accounts. The child was shown a crayon box which first contained glue, then plastic letters, and had to say what he originally thought the closed box contained, and what another child would now think. In this way, when children incorrectly described their prior belief, they would respond differently if they were infallibly making the previous belief true for its time, than if they were egocentrically making it match their current beliefs. Error patterns supported the infallibility claim, suggesting that 3- and 4-year-olds have a problem understanding how people can believe things that are not true. Another problem that preschoolers may have is with understanding the relation between perception and knowledge. Children were asked to demonstrate this understanding by assessing the plausibility of various lies in the context of different kinds of evidence about the truth. The data suggest that 4- and 5-year-olds understand that there is a relationship between perception and knowledge, and, more specifically, they know that seeing a box gives information about the size of its contents, and seeing a small part of the contents reveals color, but not necessarily identity, information. Ways of extending this plausibility task to address questions about other components of deception are discussed