In a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria, we study whether a sunspot can lead to either coordination on an inferior equilibrium (mis-coordination) or to out-of equilibrium behavior (dis-coordination). While much of the literature searches for mechanisms to attain coordination on the efficient equilibrium, we consider sunspots as a potential reason for coordination failure. We conduct an experiment with a three player 2x2x2 game in which coordination on the efficient equilibrium is easy and should normally occur. In the control session, we find almost perfect coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, but in the sunspot treatment, dis-coordination is frequent. Sunspots lead to significant inefficiency, and we conclude that ...
Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, ...
Abstract This paper presents experimental evidence on coordination games with two Pareto-rankable eq...
We conduct experiments with human subjects in a model with a positive production externality in whic...
This paper presents an experiment on a coordination game with extrinsic random signals, in which we ...
We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. T...
We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. T...
Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major theoretical attention over the...
We investigate sunspot behavior in the context of a bank-run game in controlled laboratory environme...
International audienceThis paper considers games with two players for which it provides a sufficient...
This paper considers games with two players for which it provides a sufficient condition on the resp...
<p>In this game there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (T, T) and (D, D). We Pareto rank equil...
We solve and test experimentally a global-games model of speculative attacks where agents can choose...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. T...
We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici-pants interac...
Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, ...
Abstract This paper presents experimental evidence on coordination games with two Pareto-rankable eq...
We conduct experiments with human subjects in a model with a positive production externality in whic...
This paper presents an experiment on a coordination game with extrinsic random signals, in which we ...
We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. T...
We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. T...
Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major theoretical attention over the...
We investigate sunspot behavior in the context of a bank-run game in controlled laboratory environme...
International audienceThis paper considers games with two players for which it provides a sufficient...
This paper considers games with two players for which it provides a sufficient condition on the resp...
<p>In this game there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (T, T) and (D, D). We Pareto rank equil...
We solve and test experimentally a global-games model of speculative attacks where agents can choose...
Many recent macroeconomic models exhibit multiple Nash equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Many (i...
We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. T...
We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici-pants interac...
Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, ...
Abstract This paper presents experimental evidence on coordination games with two Pareto-rankable eq...
We conduct experiments with human subjects in a model with a positive production externality in whic...