In the second lecture of Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke presented a new and quite convincing picture of the reference of proper names. At the same time, however, he expressed some skepticism towards the possibility of developing it into a full-blown theory by offering “more exact conditions for reference to take place.” In this paper, after discussing the reasons for his skepticism, I hint at how I think Kripke’s picture could be developed and offer an outline of a theory of reference based on it. One of the key notions my ‘theory’ makes use of is that of repetition, which I take from Kaplan’s “Words.
This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive con...
Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, l...
Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, l...
In the second lecture of "Naming and Necessity," Saul Kripke presented a new and quite convincing pi...
In the second lecture of "Naming and Necessity," Saul Kripke presented a new and quite convincing pi...
In the second lecture of "Naming and Necessity," Saul Kripke presented a new and quite convincing pi...
Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the proper...
Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the proper...
Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description th...
Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the proper...
Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description th...
This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive con...
Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description th...
This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive con...
Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description th...
This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive con...
Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, l...
Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, l...
In the second lecture of "Naming and Necessity," Saul Kripke presented a new and quite convincing pi...
In the second lecture of "Naming and Necessity," Saul Kripke presented a new and quite convincing pi...
In the second lecture of "Naming and Necessity," Saul Kripke presented a new and quite convincing pi...
Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the proper...
Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the proper...
Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description th...
Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the proper...
Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description th...
This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive con...
Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description th...
This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive con...
Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description th...
This paper is an attempt to present a Kripkean (Causal) picture of Reference where the cognitive con...
Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, l...
Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, l...