In this article, we study the behavior of a population composed by rational individuals , which interact through a binary game. After deducing the kinetic description of the system, we study existence and uniqueness of the resulting equation. We then focus our attention on a linear game and provide its asymptotics in the high-frequency and vanishing payoff case. Several numerical simulations show the quantitative behavior of the model
This paper formulates evolutionary game theory with a new concept using statistical mechanics. This ...
A nonlinear kinetic equation of Boltzmann type which describes the evolution of wealth in a pure gam...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
This article studies the kinetic dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors binary game in a measure settin...
This article studies the kinetic dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors binary game. We first prove exi...
A dynamic adjustment mechanism, based on replicator dynamics in discrete time, is used to study the ...
Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Beh...
Game-theoretic approach has been providing a powerful tool in qualitative understanding of macroscop...
This dissertation contains four essays about evolutionary learning dynamics and the quantal response...
Heckman and MaCurdy (1985) first showed that binary outcomes are compatible with linear econometric ...
Nonlinear dynamics makes use of attactors to describe asymptotic behavior of complex systems. Howeve...
Basic games, where each individual chooses between two strategies, illustrate several issues that im...
This paper has two purposes. The first is to describe the existing theory of long-run behavior of po...
We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occ...
Population learning in dynamic economies has been traditionally studied in over-simplified settings ...
This paper formulates evolutionary game theory with a new concept using statistical mechanics. This ...
A nonlinear kinetic equation of Boltzmann type which describes the evolution of wealth in a pure gam...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...
This article studies the kinetic dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors binary game in a measure settin...
This article studies the kinetic dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors binary game. We first prove exi...
A dynamic adjustment mechanism, based on replicator dynamics in discrete time, is used to study the ...
Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Beh...
Game-theoretic approach has been providing a powerful tool in qualitative understanding of macroscop...
This dissertation contains four essays about evolutionary learning dynamics and the quantal response...
Heckman and MaCurdy (1985) first showed that binary outcomes are compatible with linear econometric ...
Nonlinear dynamics makes use of attactors to describe asymptotic behavior of complex systems. Howeve...
Basic games, where each individual chooses between two strategies, illustrate several issues that im...
This paper has two purposes. The first is to describe the existing theory of long-run behavior of po...
We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occ...
Population learning in dynamic economies has been traditionally studied in over-simplified settings ...
This paper formulates evolutionary game theory with a new concept using statistical mechanics. This ...
A nonlinear kinetic equation of Boltzmann type which describes the evolution of wealth in a pure gam...
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between player...