The Questions of Compliance With the NPT Regime and Complex Multilateral Nuclear Negotiations: A Comparative Analysis of North Korea and Iran As Defector States

With the exception of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons have never been used in a war despite the conditions of international relations characterized by constant conflict and instability. The norm of nuclear nonproliferation institutionalized by the NPT has been the major force behind this remarkable achievement. Yet, there have been increasing concerns about the erosion of the NPT regime due to noncompliance with the treaty\u27s fundamental nonproliferation obligations by some \u27states of concern,\u27 seeking to possess and develop nuclear weapons. In particular, North Korea\u27s unrestricted development of nuclear weapons and Iran\u27s continuing assertion of its \u27inalienable right\u27 to pursue peaceful nuclear activities in defiance of a number of UN Security Council resolutions have posed fundamental challenges to the NPT. The dissertation examines two major questions: why and under what conditions are rules and norms of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime violated by some \u27states of concern,\u27 notably North Korea and Iran? How do we best explain the different dynamics of the nuclear nonproliferation negotiations between the major powers and these defector states within the framework of the NPT regime? By examining both questions in sequence, this research seeks to shed light on how differences in Pyongyang\u27s and Tehran\u27s rationales and major policy objectives to deviate from the global nuclear nonproliferation norm in the first place would have a bearing on the differences in their multilateral negotiations with the major powers (the six-party talks on North Korea\u27s nuclear crisis and the P5-plus-1 on Iran\u27s) later on