Third-party states in ethnic conflict: Identifying the domestic determinants of intervention

Why are some states predisposed to intervene in other states’ ethnic conflicts?1 Internal wars continue to outpace interstate wars both in intensity and duration, so questions about ethnic intervention are becoming central to the study of violent conflict (Saideman 1997, 1998, 2001a,b; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000; Carment and Rowlands 2001; Kaufman 2001; Sislin and Pearson 2001). Far from resolving internal disputes, third-party involvement frequently translates into interference-prolonging and even intensifying such conflicts. Indeed, many of the most intractable civil conflicts in recent decades are marked by highprofile and disastrous interventions by outside states. Examples include India’s 1987 efforts to mediate Sri Lanka’s protracted conflict, Russia’s intervention in the civil wars in Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova and Azerbaijan, Turkey and Greece’s involvement in the Cypriot conflicts, and confrontations between India and Pakistan over successive Kashmiri insurgencies (Carment 1994). Major issues in both theory and policy related to ethnic intervention and its aftermath continue to challenge the field (Hayden 1996a,b; Wallace 1996; Woodward 1996)