We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group member contribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadership increases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism, especially so when it goes along with authority in the form of granting the leader exclusion power. Whether leadership is fixed or rotating among group members has no significant influence on contributions. Only a minority of groups succeeds in endogenously installing a leader, even though groups with leaders are much more efficient than groups without a leader
Previous research offers compelling evidence that leaders suffice to effect efficiency-enhancements ...
We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute tha...
International audienceWe examine experimentally how and why voluntary contributions are affected by ...
We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments. Leadership is im...
Leadership is important for the well-functioning of organizations. We examine the effects of leaders...
We study the effects of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games when each group memb...
We rely on the methodology of Fischbacher et al. (2001) in order to identify subjects’ behavioral ty...
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are ...
Free riding and coordination failure are two common problems in collective actions. Recent theoretic...
We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative im...
We study how leader compensation affects public goods provision. We report from a lab experiment wit...
To study the effect of centralized authority in the provision of public goods game, this paper compa...
Our experimental results suggest that the effectiveness of leading by example decreases with group s...
International audienceIn social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, ...
We show that the preference to act as a leader rather than as a follower is related to subjects’ beh...
Previous research offers compelling evidence that leaders suffice to effect efficiency-enhancements ...
We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute tha...
International audienceWe examine experimentally how and why voluntary contributions are affected by ...
We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments. Leadership is im...
Leadership is important for the well-functioning of organizations. We examine the effects of leaders...
We study the effects of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games when each group memb...
We rely on the methodology of Fischbacher et al. (2001) in order to identify subjects’ behavioral ty...
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are ...
Free riding and coordination failure are two common problems in collective actions. Recent theoretic...
We study the effects of leadership in the provision of public goods by examining (i) the relative im...
We study how leader compensation affects public goods provision. We report from a lab experiment wit...
To study the effect of centralized authority in the provision of public goods game, this paper compa...
Our experimental results suggest that the effectiveness of leading by example decreases with group s...
International audienceIn social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, ...
We show that the preference to act as a leader rather than as a follower is related to subjects’ beh...
Previous research offers compelling evidence that leaders suffice to effect efficiency-enhancements ...
We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute tha...
International audienceWe examine experimentally how and why voluntary contributions are affected by ...