Add to ORKGWe develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation
This is the author (and extended) version of the manuscript of the same name published in the procee...
AbstractSecret or private information may be leaked to an external attacker through the timing behav...
We propose a method for engineering security protocols that are aware of timing aspects. We study a ...
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneou...
Cryptographic cores are known to leak information about their private key due to runtime variations,...
Cryptographic cores are known to leak information about their private key due to runtime variations,...
Abstract—Cryptographic function implementations are known to leak information about private keys thr...
This book deals with timing attacks on software implementations of encryption algorithms. It describ...
In this paper we describe a method for verifying secure information flow of programs, where apart fr...
In this paper we describe a method for verifying secure information flow of programs, where apart fr...
Abstract—We show that the amount of information about the key that an unknown-message attacker can e...
In the information security field of computer science, the questions of whether a program is safe or...
When the running time of a cryptographic algorithm is non-constant, timing measurements can leak inf...
This is the author (and extended) version of the manuscript of the same name published in the procee...
This is the author (and extended) version of the manuscript of the same name published in the procee...
This is the author (and extended) version of the manuscript of the same name published in the procee...
AbstractSecret or private information may be leaked to an external attacker through the timing behav...
We propose a method for engineering security protocols that are aware of timing aspects. We study a ...
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneou...
Cryptographic cores are known to leak information about their private key due to runtime variations,...
Cryptographic cores are known to leak information about their private key due to runtime variations,...
Abstract—Cryptographic function implementations are known to leak information about private keys thr...
This book deals with timing attacks on software implementations of encryption algorithms. It describ...
In this paper we describe a method for verifying secure information flow of programs, where apart fr...
In this paper we describe a method for verifying secure information flow of programs, where apart fr...
Abstract—We show that the amount of information about the key that an unknown-message attacker can e...
In the information security field of computer science, the questions of whether a program is safe or...
When the running time of a cryptographic algorithm is non-constant, timing measurements can leak inf...
This is the author (and extended) version of the manuscript of the same name published in the procee...
This is the author (and extended) version of the manuscript of the same name published in the procee...
This is the author (and extended) version of the manuscript of the same name published in the procee...
AbstractSecret or private information may be leaked to an external attacker through the timing behav...
We propose a method for engineering security protocols that are aware of timing aspects. We study a ...