Assessing the Success of Dual Use Programs: The Case of DARPA\u27s Relationship with SEMATECH—Quiet Contributions to Success, Silenced Partner, or Both

This dissertation investigates a major change in U.S. Government research and development policy away from its traditional mission-based model, toward a distinctly commercially-oriented research approach. The SEMATECH project is offered as an example of a Government Industry Partnership (GIP) dedicated to the development of dual-use programs (DUP) with the stated purpose of regaining technological superiority and market dominance in the production of a technology that had significant implications to national economic and military security. The study, builds upon the previous research of Horrigan, 1996; Porter, 1990; Geisler, 1993, 1997, 2003; Fong, 2000; Harlen 2008, 2010; and Brown, 2010. The study utilizes the process tracing methodology, and structured interviews to make some level of commentary concerning the effectiveness of the SEMATECH model and whether or not this model enabled the government and its primary sponsor, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to acquire any tangible technological benefits (equities) for the funds invested. This study also endeavors to ascertain under what conditions DARPA contributed to the success of this project, and if the government served a distinct and necessary purpose in advancing competitiveness. The study presents unexpected findings concerning the government equities that should have emerged from SEMATECH. The unexpected findings reveal that the government did not receive any tangible return on its investment in SEMATECH in part because it did, or could not focus its efforts on repeatedly emphasized government research agendas. This inability to advance its research interest is a direct result of how SEMATECH was formed, and how it was funded. In spite of the severe limitations associated with the U.S. government\u27s abdication of direction setting prerogatives, DARPA still managed to make contributions that were necessary to the success of SEMATECH\u27s commercial and competitive objectives. Conclusions include indications that policy structured using SEMATECH as a model may not be the best model upon which to build future GIPs which focus on DUPs