In the work, a cooperative game where distance or similarity of players may be defined is considered. A characteristic function is defined in such a way that it is high for such coalitions which consist of more similar objects than objects from other coalitions. We consider the function which may not be superadditive that is why not only the grand coalition but smaller ones can be formed and considering a game with coalitional structure is reasonable. Therefore, we have a natural transformation from a cooperative game to a clustering problem. Several single-valued cooperative solution concepts are considered with this type of a characteristic function and stability conditions are found
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, includ...
The present work investigates sharing rules in a cooperative game theory framework for situations in...
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is eith...
In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperat...
Clustering refers to the process of extracting maximally coherent groups from a set of objects using...
In the standard cooperative games, it is often implicitly assumed that any coalition may form and th...
Cooperative games with transferable utilities, or simply TU-games, refer to the situations where the...
Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitiona...
In this paper, we develop a game theoretic approach for clustering features in a learning problem. F...
In a cooperative game with transferable utility, it is usually assumed that all coalitions are equal...
The problem of clustering consists in organizing a set of objects into groups or clusters, in a way ...
In many real-world settings, the structure of the environment constrains the formation of coalitions...
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of th...
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a coalition and e...
Clustering is a technique for discovering patterns and structure in data. Often, the most difficult ...
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, includ...
The present work investigates sharing rules in a cooperative game theory framework for situations in...
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is eith...
In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperat...
Clustering refers to the process of extracting maximally coherent groups from a set of objects using...
In the standard cooperative games, it is often implicitly assumed that any coalition may form and th...
Cooperative games with transferable utilities, or simply TU-games, refer to the situations where the...
Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitiona...
In this paper, we develop a game theoretic approach for clustering features in a learning problem. F...
In a cooperative game with transferable utility, it is usually assumed that all coalitions are equal...
The problem of clustering consists in organizing a set of objects into groups or clusters, in a way ...
In many real-world settings, the structure of the environment constrains the formation of coalitions...
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of th...
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a coalition and e...
Clustering is a technique for discovering patterns and structure in data. Often, the most difficult ...
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, includ...
The present work investigates sharing rules in a cooperative game theory framework for situations in...
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is eith...