This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but distributes the output equally otherwise, provided that the agents are sufficiently inequity averse
We explore bases for deciding to team among agents and present an algorithm that bases that decision...
The conventional economic model presumes that efficient outcomes prevail but this prediction is not ...
We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a coopera...
This paper analyzes the effi ciency of team production when risk- neutral agents exhibit other-regar...
This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preference...
We study how the optimal contract in team production is affected when employees are averse to inequi...
This paper models the behavior of team members in a consistent conjectures equilibrium. When subject...
We study the consequences of inequity aversion in a purely non-cooperative model of team production ...
We study how the optimal contract in team production is a¤ected when employees are averse to inequit...
We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available informatio...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
The Team-maxmin equilibrium prescribes the optimal strategies for a team of rational players sharing...
We study optimal incentive contracts in teams which consist of two groups of agents di¤ering in thei...
This dissertation analyzes the incentives of workers in organizations that utilize teams. In Chapter...
We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available informatio...
We explore bases for deciding to team among agents and present an algorithm that bases that decision...
The conventional economic model presumes that efficient outcomes prevail but this prediction is not ...
We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a coopera...
This paper analyzes the effi ciency of team production when risk- neutral agents exhibit other-regar...
This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preference...
We study how the optimal contract in team production is affected when employees are averse to inequi...
This paper models the behavior of team members in a consistent conjectures equilibrium. When subject...
We study the consequences of inequity aversion in a purely non-cooperative model of team production ...
We study how the optimal contract in team production is a¤ected when employees are averse to inequit...
We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available informatio...
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by F...
The Team-maxmin equilibrium prescribes the optimal strategies for a team of rational players sharing...
We study optimal incentive contracts in teams which consist of two groups of agents di¤ering in thei...
This dissertation analyzes the incentives of workers in organizations that utilize teams. In Chapter...
We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available informatio...
We explore bases for deciding to team among agents and present an algorithm that bases that decision...
The conventional economic model presumes that efficient outcomes prevail but this prediction is not ...
We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a coopera...
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