Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in separation from top down due to an unraveling process similar to Akerlof (1970). De and Nabar (1991) argue that imperfect certification prevents unraveling so that equilibria with full separation do not exist. This note shows that, if one considers the buyers' buying decision explicitly, a separating equilibrium with imperfect certification does exist
A prevalent feature in rating markets is the possibility for the client to hide the outcome of the r...
Document de travailThis article is concerned with the analysis of quality competition when the distr...
Markets typically have many ways of learning about quality, with two of the most important being rep...
Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in sepa...
A label that imperfectly signals product quality is analyzed in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiat...
This paper focuses on consumer confusion when firms may choose between credible and non-credible cer...
In markets with qualitative uncertainty, pricing on the basis of average quality will be unattractiv...
Asymmetric information is a classic example of market failure that undermines the efficiency associa...
The paper offers a simple theory of pricing behavior in certification markets. The basis for the the...
The paper constructs a two-period and an infinitely repeated signaling model for the certification o...
The paper develops a simple theory of segmentation and fee-setting in certification markets. The bas...
This paper offers a theoretical analysis of imperfect competition in certification markets. Firms th...
Cahier de recherche ; 2006-03 2006-03We analyze a two-sender quality-signaling game in a duopoly mod...
International audienceA seller can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of ...
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price...
A prevalent feature in rating markets is the possibility for the client to hide the outcome of the r...
Document de travailThis article is concerned with the analysis of quality competition when the distr...
Markets typically have many ways of learning about quality, with two of the most important being rep...
Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in sepa...
A label that imperfectly signals product quality is analyzed in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiat...
This paper focuses on consumer confusion when firms may choose between credible and non-credible cer...
In markets with qualitative uncertainty, pricing on the basis of average quality will be unattractiv...
Asymmetric information is a classic example of market failure that undermines the efficiency associa...
The paper offers a simple theory of pricing behavior in certification markets. The basis for the the...
The paper constructs a two-period and an infinitely repeated signaling model for the certification o...
The paper develops a simple theory of segmentation and fee-setting in certification markets. The bas...
This paper offers a theoretical analysis of imperfect competition in certification markets. Firms th...
Cahier de recherche ; 2006-03 2006-03We analyze a two-sender quality-signaling game in a duopoly mod...
International audienceA seller can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of ...
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price...
A prevalent feature in rating markets is the possibility for the client to hide the outcome of the r...
Document de travailThis article is concerned with the analysis of quality competition when the distr...
Markets typically have many ways of learning about quality, with two of the most important being rep...
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