Add to ORKGWe characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members
This paper investigates whether an efficient all-inclusive cartel mechanism studied by McAfee and Mc...
Collusion is a serious concern in real-life allocation problems. Auctions, for example, often create...
Collusion is a serious concern in real-life allocation problems. Auctions, for example, often create...
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders can...
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders can...
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders can...
McAfee and McMillan (1992) investigate the coordinated biding strategies in a strong cartel, in whic...
Manipulating prices in auctions raises antitrust concerns. Collusion lowers the revenue of the aucti...
This dissertation is about an open question of cartel ratifiable conditions. My research goal is to ...
This dissertation is about an open question of cartel ratifiable conditions. My research goal is to ...
We study collusion in a large class of private-value auctions by cartels whose members cannot exchan...
This article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value enviro...
This paper investigates whether an efficient all-inclusive cartel mechanism studied by McAfee and Mc...
This article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value enviro...
This paper studies the optimal auction for a seller who is bound to sell a single item to one of two...
This paper investigates whether an efficient all-inclusive cartel mechanism studied by McAfee and Mc...
Collusion is a serious concern in real-life allocation problems. Auctions, for example, often create...
Collusion is a serious concern in real-life allocation problems. Auctions, for example, often create...
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders can...
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders can...
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders can...
McAfee and McMillan (1992) investigate the coordinated biding strategies in a strong cartel, in whic...
Manipulating prices in auctions raises antitrust concerns. Collusion lowers the revenue of the aucti...
This dissertation is about an open question of cartel ratifiable conditions. My research goal is to ...
This dissertation is about an open question of cartel ratifiable conditions. My research goal is to ...
We study collusion in a large class of private-value auctions by cartels whose members cannot exchan...
This article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value enviro...
This paper investigates whether an efficient all-inclusive cartel mechanism studied by McAfee and Mc...
This article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value enviro...
This paper studies the optimal auction for a seller who is bound to sell a single item to one of two...
This paper investigates whether an efficient all-inclusive cartel mechanism studied by McAfee and Mc...
Collusion is a serious concern in real-life allocation problems. Auctions, for example, often create...
Collusion is a serious concern in real-life allocation problems. Auctions, for example, often create...