Add to ORKGWe present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic signaling games based on rationality postulates for off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This refinement concept eliminates equilibria which Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive grounds. In addition, we derive a characterization of the set of stable equilibria [Kohlberg and Mertens (1982)] for generic signaling games in terms of equilibrium strategies and restrictions on beliefs. Examples are given which differentiate the predictions of these equilibrium concepts
In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in perea (2005) t...
Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games – single rou...
The two games that are typically used to model markets with asymmetric information are the signallin...
We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic sign...
In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be "unambig...
We study equilibrium selection in signaling games by perfect fore-sight dynamics. We consider a sign...
In this paper, we study a general class of monotone signaling games, in which the support of the sig...
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model...
Sun L. Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working ...
This thesis concerns the interactions between asymmetrically informed agents where information can p...
Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs o ¤ the ...
This paper investigates the refinements of Nash equilibrium in two person signaling game experiments...
The author proposes a refinement of seq uential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing...
We show, that Strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasiperfect in ...
Well-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. The author proves that addi...
In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in perea (2005) t...
Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games – single rou...
The two games that are typically used to model markets with asymmetric information are the signallin...
We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic sign...
In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be "unambig...
We study equilibrium selection in signaling games by perfect fore-sight dynamics. We consider a sign...
In this paper, we study a general class of monotone signaling games, in which the support of the sig...
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model...
Sun L. Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working ...
This thesis concerns the interactions between asymmetrically informed agents where information can p...
Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs o ¤ the ...
This paper investigates the refinements of Nash equilibrium in two person signaling game experiments...
The author proposes a refinement of seq uential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing...
We show, that Strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasiperfect in ...
Well-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. The author proves that addi...
In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in perea (2005) t...
Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games – single rou...
The two games that are typically used to model markets with asymmetric information are the signallin...