We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are to be made over both ideological and distributive dimensions. In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together, despite having preferences that are separable over the two dimensions. The equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions, and the set of legislators who approve winning proposals does not always consist of ideologically adjacent legislators. There is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved. We show that legislators can gain from forming political parties, and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties
In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition ...
This paper studies a sequential model of multilateral bargaining under majority rule in which legisl...
A self-enforcing, equilibrium account of legislative party organization in the context of the standa...
We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are to be made over both ideological and distri...
where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative...
We experimentally investigate the Jackson-Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy...
Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' belief...
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where...
This paper begins with a contrast between the conclusions of theoretical and empirical work on distr...
There has been an extensive debate over the role and strength of political parties in the American C...
Basic arithmetic of legislative decisions / 1 Despite the huge number of possible seat distributions...
The paper analyses the process of coalition formation among political parties using game-theoretic c...
We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over po...
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decisio...
<div><p>The policy positions parties choose are central to both attracting voters and forming coalit...
In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition ...
This paper studies a sequential model of multilateral bargaining under majority rule in which legisl...
A self-enforcing, equilibrium account of legislative party organization in the context of the standa...
We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are to be made over both ideological and distri...
where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative...
We experimentally investigate the Jackson-Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy...
Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' belief...
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where...
This paper begins with a contrast between the conclusions of theoretical and empirical work on distr...
There has been an extensive debate over the role and strength of political parties in the American C...
Basic arithmetic of legislative decisions / 1 Despite the huge number of possible seat distributions...
The paper analyses the process of coalition formation among political parties using game-theoretic c...
We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over po...
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decisio...
<div><p>The policy positions parties choose are central to both attracting voters and forming coalit...
In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition ...
This paper studies a sequential model of multilateral bargaining under majority rule in which legisl...
A self-enforcing, equilibrium account of legislative party organization in the context of the standa...