An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Wholesale Electricity Markets

Being widely used in many deregulated wholesale electricity markets, the locational marginal pricing (LMP) mechanism is known to achieve social optimality in a competitive market. When profit-maximizing generators act strategically to manipulate prices; however, LMP may lead to high loss of economic efficiency. In this paper, we apply the Vickrey-Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism to wholesale electricity markets. We show that the VCG mechanism minimizes the total cost at a truth-telling dominant strategy equilibrium. We establish an important comparative result that the VCG mechanism always results in higher per-unit electricity prices than the LMP mechanism under any given set of reported supply curves. Numerical results show that the difference between the per-unit prices resulting from the two mechanisms is negligibly small (about 4%) in the IEEE 14-bus and 30-bus test systems. Finally, we apply the VCG mechanism to a day-ahead setting with start-up cost (of conventional generators) and intermittent renewable generation. We show that the VCG mechanism induces the truth-telling behavior of conventional generators in dominant strategies and yields each conventional generator a non-negative expected profit