Add to ORKGWe introduce two new sufficient conditions for the existence of stable outcomes in many-to-one matching with contracts. The conditions subsume the observable substitutability of Hatfield et al. (2015) and the substitutable completability of Hatfield and Kominers (2016) as special cases. We also prove that unilaterally substitutability and irrelevance of rejected contracts imply substitutable completability
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We introduce two new sufficient conditions for the existence of stable outcomes in many-to-one match...
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts an...
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts an...
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity in fact have an und...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We characterize when a stable and strategy-proof mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the setting of ...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts which sub-sumes as special cases many-to-...
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We introduce two new sufficient conditions for the existence of stable outcomes in many-to-one match...
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts an...
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts an...
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity in fact have an und...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We characterize when a stable and strategy-proof mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the setting of ...
This paper studies many-to-one matching such as matching between students and colleges, interns and ...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts which sub-sumes as special cases many-to-...
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which th...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the cla...