Add to ORKGWe present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic uncertainty and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an agent may make an early offer because she is concerned that others are making early offers. Yet other agents make early offers because they are concerned that others worry about early offers; and so on and so forth. The end result is that any given agent is more likely to make an early offer than a later offer
This dissertation examines two problems that may arise in matching problems. The first two chapters ...
We study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially produc...
We study the role of transfers in the timing of matching. In our model, some agents have the option ...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanat...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanat...
Abstract. We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in match-ing markets. O...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in match-ing markets. Our explana...
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, age...
Unraveling, the excessively early matching of future workers to employers, leads to hiring decisions...
I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The exp...
We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In th...
In this paper we explore how the balance of agents on the two sides of a matching market impacts the...
We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In ...
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to com...
We present a two-period model of the assignment market with uncertainty in the first period regardin...
This dissertation examines two problems that may arise in matching problems. The first two chapters ...
We study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially produc...
We study the role of transfers in the timing of matching. In our model, some agents have the option ...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanat...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanat...
Abstract. We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in match-ing markets. O...
We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in match-ing markets. Our explana...
We study how information perturbations can destabilize two-sided matching markets. In our model, age...
Unraveling, the excessively early matching of future workers to employers, leads to hiring decisions...
I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The exp...
We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In th...
In this paper we explore how the balance of agents on the two sides of a matching market impacts the...
We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In ...
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to com...
We present a two-period model of the assignment market with uncertainty in the first period regardin...
This dissertation examines two problems that may arise in matching problems. The first two chapters ...
We study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially produc...
We study the role of transfers in the timing of matching. In our model, some agents have the option ...