Using a complete enumeration of credit contracts for a rural area in Burgundy, this article examines how credit markets functioned and what role they served. Credit markets distributed funds to a large fraction of the population, and they were organized to mediate problems of asymmetric information. A central constrain on credit markets, however, was the threat of government intervention. Because of this threat, capital markets remained relatively isolated from one another
Between 1550 and 1730, privileged investors in France--nobles, officers, and wealthy merchants--boug...
This paper uses a simple economic model of contract choice to explain the growth of sharecropping in...
Using evidence from leases and price series, this article examines the total factor productivity of ...
Using a complete enumeration of credit contracts for a rural area in Burgundy, this article examines...
Relying on a large sample of private and public loan contracts taken from Parisian notarial records,...
We document how intermediaries shaped markets or, conversely, how market institutions constrained in...
Based on a large sample from Parisian notarial records, this article examines the long-term private ...
This articles examines the impact of two themes in Kenneth Sokoloff’s research on mid nineteenth-cen...
This paper analyzes a sample of loan contracts from a town in southeastern France between 1630 and 1...
Presents a study which attempted to evaluate the French Revolution by examining the political econom...
Quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that the returns to irrigation in France were similar ...
Through a close reading of scattered, disparate, and largely unconnected secondary sources, suppleme...
Economics and Politics Credit Markets in Paris 1750-1840. Using new data set on public and private...
The “less-developed” interior of early modern Europe, especially the rural economy, is often regarde...
the paper examines the spread of sharecropping that followed a wave of investment in agriculture in ...
Between 1550 and 1730, privileged investors in France--nobles, officers, and wealthy merchants--boug...
This paper uses a simple economic model of contract choice to explain the growth of sharecropping in...
Using evidence from leases and price series, this article examines the total factor productivity of ...
Using a complete enumeration of credit contracts for a rural area in Burgundy, this article examines...
Relying on a large sample of private and public loan contracts taken from Parisian notarial records,...
We document how intermediaries shaped markets or, conversely, how market institutions constrained in...
Based on a large sample from Parisian notarial records, this article examines the long-term private ...
This articles examines the impact of two themes in Kenneth Sokoloff’s research on mid nineteenth-cen...
This paper analyzes a sample of loan contracts from a town in southeastern France between 1630 and 1...
Presents a study which attempted to evaluate the French Revolution by examining the political econom...
Quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that the returns to irrigation in France were similar ...
Through a close reading of scattered, disparate, and largely unconnected secondary sources, suppleme...
Economics and Politics Credit Markets in Paris 1750-1840. Using new data set on public and private...
The “less-developed” interior of early modern Europe, especially the rural economy, is often regarde...
the paper examines the spread of sharecropping that followed a wave of investment in agriculture in ...
Between 1550 and 1730, privileged investors in France--nobles, officers, and wealthy merchants--boug...
This paper uses a simple economic model of contract choice to explain the growth of sharecropping in...
Using evidence from leases and price series, this article examines the total factor productivity of ...