When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the same network, the resulting equilibrium may no longer be interpreted as a solution to the standard utility maximization problem. We prove the existence of equilibrium in general multi-protocol networks under mild assumptions. For almost all networks, the equilibria are locally unique, and finite and odd in number. They cannot all be locally stable unless it is globally unique. Finally, we show that if the price mapping functions that map link prices to effective prices observed by the sources are similar, then global uniqueness is guaranteed
We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated...
Abstract. We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We ...
We derive a model of congestion control where the trade-off between utility and path diversity can b...
Abstract — When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals s...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
Abstract — When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals (...
It has been proved theoretically that a network with heterogeneous congestion control algorithms tha...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the s...
It has been proved theoretically that a network with heterogeneous congestion control algorithms tha...
We study control of congestion in general topology communication networks within a fairly general ma...
We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated...
We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated...
Abstract. We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We ...
We derive a model of congestion control where the trade-off between utility and path diversity can b...
Abstract — When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals s...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the sa...
Abstract — When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals (...
It has been proved theoretically that a network with heterogeneous congestion control algorithms tha...
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the s...
It has been proved theoretically that a network with heterogeneous congestion control algorithms tha...
We study control of congestion in general topology communication networks within a fairly general ma...
We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated...
We study the existence and uniqueness of equilibria for perfectly competitive markets in capacitated...
Abstract. We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We ...
We derive a model of congestion control where the trade-off between utility and path diversity can b...