We provide a set of new models of three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party leaders,nominations by a vote of party members, and nominations by a spending competition among potential candidates. We show that more extreme outcomes can emerge from spending competition than from nominations by votes or by party leaders, and that non-median outcomes can result via any of these processes. When voters (and potential nominees) are free to switch political parties, then median outcomes ensue when nominations are decided by a vote but not when nominations are decided by spending competition
In this paper, we formalize existing normative criteria used to judge presidential selection contest...
The policy positions parties choose are central to both attracting voters and forming coalition gove...
We model political parties as adaptive decision-makers who compete in a sequence of elections. The k...
We model and compare three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a ...
Parties' candidates are chosen by different nomination rules. Recent empirical evidence shows that ...
This thesis develops a candidate-centred conception of American presidential nominations. Candidates...
Models of nomination politics in the US often find "gridlock" in equilibrium because of the super-ma...
Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fractio...
We develop a theory of candidate nomination processes predicated upon the notion that members of the...
A curious aspect of American politics is that while general election rules for Congress and the pres...
Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinan...
Models of nomination politics in the US often \u85nd "gridlock " in equilibrium because of...
In list proportional representation (PR) systems, parties shape political selection. We propose a th...
This paper combines ideas from models of electoral competition with forward-looking voters and model...
We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about t...
In this paper, we formalize existing normative criteria used to judge presidential selection contest...
The policy positions parties choose are central to both attracting voters and forming coalition gove...
We model political parties as adaptive decision-makers who compete in a sequence of elections. The k...
We model and compare three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a ...
Parties' candidates are chosen by different nomination rules. Recent empirical evidence shows that ...
This thesis develops a candidate-centred conception of American presidential nominations. Candidates...
Models of nomination politics in the US often find "gridlock" in equilibrium because of the super-ma...
Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fractio...
We develop a theory of candidate nomination processes predicated upon the notion that members of the...
A curious aspect of American politics is that while general election rules for Congress and the pres...
Framing effects and bounded rationality imply that election campaigns may be an important determinan...
Models of nomination politics in the US often \u85nd "gridlock " in equilibrium because of...
In list proportional representation (PR) systems, parties shape political selection. We propose a th...
This paper combines ideas from models of electoral competition with forward-looking voters and model...
We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about t...
In this paper, we formalize existing normative criteria used to judge presidential selection contest...
The policy positions parties choose are central to both attracting voters and forming coalition gove...
We model political parties as adaptive decision-makers who compete in a sequence of elections. The k...