Spinoza's account of composition

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston UniversityPLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you.The aim of the dissertation is to develop and defend a new interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics of individuals, focusing on his account of the conditions under which several things compose one. Spinoza's discussion of composition in the Ethics focuses on complex bodies, so Chapter 1 provides an interpretation of Spinoza's physics in order to lay the groundwork for interpreting his metaphysics. Although it may appear that Spinoza's physics is of the same stripe as the mechanical physical theories endorsed by Hobbes and Descartes, his claims about the power of finite bodies suggest that his physical theory is dynamic rather than mechanistic. Using that discussion of the physics of complex individuals as background, Chapter 2 presents an argument that Spinoza reduces composition to a certain causal relation among an individual's parts (their "pattern" [ratio] of causal relations), and that particular individuals are tokens of this causal relation. This conception of the part-whole relation explains Spinoza's account of persistence while preserving the intuition that wholes depend upon their parts. To clarify the central thesis of Spinoza's account, Chapter 3 fleshes out the notion of a pattern of causal relations. The pattern of causal relations among an individual's parts is what generates and explains that individual's causal powers. Having established the central claims of Spinoza's account of composition, Chapter 4 contains a series of arguments intended to motivate that account. There are several plausible metaphysical principles that most rival contemporary accounts of composition--universalism, nihilism, organicism, and several others--fail to satisfy. Spinoza's account does satisfy those principles; other things being equal, then, Spinoza's account is preferable to these contemporary alternatives. Finally, Chapter 5 considers a possible reply to the strongest principled argument against Spinoza's view, the argument from vagueness. Although the notion of a "pattern" of causal relations seems vague, Spinoza can appeal to the causal powers generated by such patterns in order to provide a principled cutoff between patterns and non-patterns. Spinoza's metaphysics of composition, then, is as good as, or better than, the views championed by contemporary metaphysicians. Although Spinoza's view has been largely ignored, it remains viable even today.2031-01-0