The Salvadoran Crucible: American Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992

Between 1979 and 1992 the United States engaged in its largest counterinsurgency (COIN) and nation-building exercise since the debacle in South Vietnam. For over twelve years, Washington attempted to establish a moderate government in El Salvador and defeat an insurgency by providing American military aid and training, holding elections, initiating development projects, and carrying out socioeconomic reforms. While the U.S. prevented its Salvadoran ally from economic and political collapse, Washington's efforts did not lead to the resolution of the conflict. Arguably, it prolonged the bloodshed and failed address the grievances that fueled the violence. The inability to address the latter continues to plague El Salvador more than two decades after the end of hostilities. Yet, American military strategists and writers hold up the U.S. effort in El Salvador as a successful application of counterinsurgency. Washington's undertaking in this country has also informed its more recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, a close examination of the U.S. intervention in El Salvador is required to assess the success narrative and whether it offers instructive lessons for future contingencies