Online vs. In Line: The Politics of Internet Voting in American Elections

Degree awarded: Ph.D. Government. American UniversityIn a country where new voting technologies have been implemented since the voting problems in the 2000 election in Florida, and where internet use is almost universal, it is a puzzle that internet voting has not emerged as a potential extension of the current wave of convenience voting reforms in America. The internet is widely used in many facets of political life in the US: in communication between the federal government and citizens (such as online tax filing), for donating money to political campaigns, and for disseminating political information. At the same time, since the 2000 election, state and local election administrators have searched for ways to make voting easier (to boost turnout) and more reliable (to reduce error in casting and counting ballots). Internet voting has at least the potential to accomplish these goals, but it has not been offered as an alternative in any state-administered election in the United States. Only two party-run primaries, in Arizona in 2000 and Michigan in 2004, have offered Internet voting as an option for casting a ballot.In the recent search for easy and reliable voting technologies, why have there not been more attempts to try internet voting? The most common reasons cited are security concerns and the possibility that internet voting could be an unfair voting method due to the digital divide that exists along race and class lines. Using data from a national survey and turnout data from the 2004 Michigan election that used internet voting as one voting method, I examine who would support internet voting if it were available, and who used it when it was available. This analysis can help answer the political questions that remain around internet voting, to help guide election administrators as they consider new voting methods.Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-26T17:54:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Prevost_american_0008E_10504display.pdf: 1006355 bytes, checksum: 0e35ae729f8fde56a2b27bb66c194a65 (MD5