An Ethical Argument for In Vitro Meat

This paper makes a moral argument for why in vitro meat should be adopted in favour of traditional forms of meat on the basis that doing so would reduce animal suffering. It argues that we ought to act compassionately towards animals who have the capacity to experience suffering (primarily in the form of physical pain) in a similar way to our own capacity to experience suffering. Given that the animals which are traditionally raised and slaughtered for meat (i.e. cows, pigs, and perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, chickens) have the capacity to experience pain in a significantly similar way to our capacity to experience pain, and the methods of factory farming which are implemented in the West to satisfy the human demand for consumable meat, this paper argues that, since the production of in vitro meat would produce little or no animal suffering, it would be ethical to choose to consume in vitro meat in favour of those traditional forms of meat. Further, it explores several objections to the adoption of in vitro meat from aesthetic, cultural, and religious grounds