Instituting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina\u27s Divided Society

This paper looks to examine how the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) was meant to create a stable, unified Bosnia and Herzegovina versus what was actually achieved. The institutional rules of Dayton were designed to check and balance the three ethnic groups, yet the country is defined by political division rather than cooperation. The international community, prescribed by Dayton to oversee and enforce Bosnia’s transition, has supported a flawed institutional design. The theories of consociationalism, centripetalism, and the prevalence of the ethno-territorial principle are used to explain how Dayton has failed in facilitating cooperation and moderation. The impact of the prolonged, involved role of the High Representative and the European Court of Human Right\u27s 2009 case, Sejdić and Finci, are used as analysis. I argue that Dayton’s institutional design has allowed ethnic division to define BiH\u27s political system and the prolonged intervention of the High Representative has removed incentive for local elites to cooperate