The epistemology of memory beliefs

Most of our beliefs are memory beliefs. It is rather surprising, then, that the epistemology of memory has been relatively neglected until recently. This is because memory beliefs have been traditionally understood as stored information. According to the traditional view, beliefs are stored in our memory similar to the way books are stored in a library, and just as books can get damaged, lost, or misplaced in the library, beliefs can be forgotten. The current consensus view of memory in psychology contradicts the traditional philosophical view. Memory is a constructive process; it is not mere storage and retrieval. The dissertation addresses three major questions that arise in the philosophy of memory: What is memory? How are memory beliefs justified? And can forgetful agents be rational? Chapter 2 answers the first question. I defend a capacity account that claims that memory is a neurocognitive capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information. Unlike traditional philosophical accounts, the capacity account is compatible with both current psychology and folk notions of memory. In Chapter 3, I argue for a process reliabilist view of the justification of memory beliefs. My view is distinctive in offering separate treatments of two importantly different types of processes that can generate memory beliefs, reproductive and reconstructive processes. Chapter 4 explores the final question. I make a previously unappreciated distinction between two types of forgetting: in addition to forgetting their evidence, an agent might also forget their conditional credences. I argue that thinking carefully about the rational status of forgetting conditional credences can improve our current theories of rationality in the same way that forgetting evidence has.Ph.D.Includes bibliographical referencesby Mary Salvaggi