Moral rules and representations: a developmental perspective

If a grammar is taken to be a set of rules that operate over a series of representations (Chomsky, 1980), then this dissertation uses empirical developmental methods to begin to describe components of a moral grammar. Chapter 1 reviews the current state of the literature concerning moral judgment, with a particular focus on the role of intention in moral judgment and developmental implications. Chapter 2 proposes a "conversion rule" (a good intention prior) that translates an impoverished stimulus into a rich representation of a morally charged act, which is then suitable for the application of moral rules. In particular, the conversion rule proposes that when an agent's action results in both a good and bad effect, the agent intends the good and not the bad effect. Chapter 3 argues that two moral rules used by preschoolers (the means principle and the implied consent principle) are written in abstract rather than concrete terms, taking inputs such as hierarchical action relations and utility structures rather than directly observable behaviors. Chapter 4 presents evidence that preschoolers and adults use a moral rule that draws on representations of the choices available to a moral agent. Chapter 5 draws together the chapters with concluding remarks.Ph.D.Includes bibliographical referencesby Sydney Levin