Essays on the semantics of modality

This is a dissertation on the semantics of modality and related topics. Each of the three chapters takes aim one of the most widely held assumptions concerning the semantics of modality. The assumption is criticized, and a replacement is developed to take its place. In the first chapter I take up the idea that permission should be semantically analyzed as existential quantification over possibilities. I argue that we should instead adopt an analysis involving universal quantification. The difference between permission and obligation is not one of quantificational strength, but rather one of quantificational structure. I conclude by considering how these arguments might be generalized to every flavor of modality. In the second chapter I continue with the topic of modal flavors, and I ask how we should differentiate these flavors. The traditional approach to flavor differentiation locates all flavor differences in the modal semantics: modal claims differ in flavor because they differ in meaning. I argue against this approach. I argue that the vast majority of flavor differences are not semantic differences. In the third chapter I take up the idea, ubiquitous in philosophy and linguistics, that one can use Gricean pragmatics to explain away recalcitrant data concerning the acceptability of inferences. This move, already discussed at length in chapter one, is commonly employed in debates over the semantics of modality. I argue that many of these pragmatic "rescues" are misguided. More specifically, I argue that when we can reformulate recalcitrant data in non-conversational terms (e.g., epistemological or metaphysical terms), then a pragmatic explanation of the data is out of place.Ph. D.Includes bibliographical referencesby Zachary John Mille