What are the fundamental properties of the world? What is chance? What are the laws of nature? These questions may seem isolated, but in my dissertation, A Theory of Laws, Dispositions, and Chances, I show how they are connected by developing a new account that unifies traditionally disparate elements. I defend the anti-Humean claim that there are some fundamental, modal features in the world—such as chance and dispositional properties. But, I also defend the Humean claim that the laws of nature merely describe the world, rather than govern it. According to my view, which I call the Propensity Best System Account (PBSA), some of the fundamental properties are dispositional—these properties are called potencies if they are deterministic, ...
The book is concerned with the laws of nature and in particular with the laws of physics. The author...
International audienceMetaphysics should follow science in postulating laws alongside properties. I ...
Epistemic theories of objective chance hold that chances are idealised epistemic probabilities of so...
This dissertation explores the idea that laws of nature are tools for gaining and employing informat...
Why is there a phenomenon of chance in the created world? There are many different probability distr...
A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in som...
This thesis aims to articulate a dispositionalist theory of possibility. The standard way of explain...
This dissertation develops a novel theory of laws of nature in the “Best System” tradition, with the...
The paper compares dispositionalism about laws of nature with primitivism. It argues that while the ...
This PDF file is made available by permission of Cambridge University Press. To order a hard copy, g...
Though forty years have elapsed since its first publication, it is a testament to the philosophical ...
The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysicall...
Can laws of nature be universal regularities and nevertheless have exceptions? Several answers to th...
The paper compares dispositionalism about laws of nature with primitivism. It argues that while the ...
D. M. Armstrong famously claims that deterministic laws of nature are contingent relations between u...
The book is concerned with the laws of nature and in particular with the laws of physics. The author...
International audienceMetaphysics should follow science in postulating laws alongside properties. I ...
Epistemic theories of objective chance hold that chances are idealised epistemic probabilities of so...
This dissertation explores the idea that laws of nature are tools for gaining and employing informat...
Why is there a phenomenon of chance in the created world? There are many different probability distr...
A dispositional property is a tendency, or potency, to manifest some characteristic behaviour in som...
This thesis aims to articulate a dispositionalist theory of possibility. The standard way of explain...
This dissertation develops a novel theory of laws of nature in the “Best System” tradition, with the...
The paper compares dispositionalism about laws of nature with primitivism. It argues that while the ...
This PDF file is made available by permission of Cambridge University Press. To order a hard copy, g...
Though forty years have elapsed since its first publication, it is a testament to the philosophical ...
The paper defends a naturalistic version of modal actualism according to which what is metaphysicall...
Can laws of nature be universal regularities and nevertheless have exceptions? Several answers to th...
The paper compares dispositionalism about laws of nature with primitivism. It argues that while the ...
D. M. Armstrong famously claims that deterministic laws of nature are contingent relations between u...
The book is concerned with the laws of nature and in particular with the laws of physics. The author...
International audienceMetaphysics should follow science in postulating laws alongside properties. I ...
Epistemic theories of objective chance hold that chances are idealised epistemic probabilities of so...