Denominational Incompatibility and Religious Pluralism: A Non-Pluralist Response to a Pluralist Critique

Religious Pluralism is the view that no one religion is correct, and no religion enjoys special status in relation to the Ultimate. Recently, Samuel Ruhmkorff has defended Religious Pluralism from what we\u27ll call \u27The Incompatibility Objection\u27: many religions appear to make incompatible claims about ultimate reality, and therefore they cannot all be true. Ruhmkorff defends Religious Pluralism from the incompatibility problem by applying a “subsets of belief” defense that non-pluralists may use in response to denominational differences within a religion. He argues that non-pluralists are faced with denominational incompatibility within whatever religion they are asserting is uniquely true. He further argues that if a non-pluralist claims that only a single denomination is correct, then this brings them dangerously close to a kind of “religious solipsism.” My argument is that it is unnecessary for the non-pluralist to resort to the belief subset argument, and when the pluralist employs the belief subset argument it still reaches a non-pluralist conclusion. This is because religious solipsism does not appear to pose a real threat to non-pluralism, and the belief subset argument only succeeds in designating an authoritative belief subset as uniquely true apart from other beliefs