This study examines the factors of electoral victory. In particular, it empirically tests whether having term limits on an executive’s time in office affects the margin of election victory by a candidate by using a panel data analysis on a dataset consisting of all countries for the time period between 1975 and 2015. The dependent variable measures the number of votes received in an election victory and the main independent variable measures whether or not a country has formal restraints on an executive’s term in office. This study finds that, on average, the winner of an election in a country with formal restraints on an executive’s term in office will receive 11.08 percent more votes than an election winner in a country without formal res...
In developed democracies, incumbents are consistently found to have an electoral advantage over thei...
Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting auto...
Building on models of electoral competition with reputational mechanisms, I show that term limits de...
This Paper analyses the impact of term limits in a political agency model. We find that term limits ...
This study examines the impact of state legislative term limits on the candidacy decisions of challe...
This article investigates the relationship between term limits and international conflict. Theories ...
at numerous conferences and workshops for comments and discussions. We would also like to thank Jaso...
California’s legislative term limits have dramatically reduced campaign expenditures. Real expenditu...
This paper studies the impact of binding term limits on voter turnout, analyzing the Portuguese exp...
Since the late 20th century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to expand term li...
We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimat...
Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting auto...
1We thank seminar participants at MIT for helpful comments. Professor Ansolabehere wishes to thank t...
Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting auto...
We evaluate the e¤ects of the duration of legislative terms on the performance of legislators. Causa...
In developed democracies, incumbents are consistently found to have an electoral advantage over thei...
Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting auto...
Building on models of electoral competition with reputational mechanisms, I show that term limits de...
This Paper analyses the impact of term limits in a political agency model. We find that term limits ...
This study examines the impact of state legislative term limits on the candidacy decisions of challe...
This article investigates the relationship between term limits and international conflict. Theories ...
at numerous conferences and workshops for comments and discussions. We would also like to thank Jaso...
California’s legislative term limits have dramatically reduced campaign expenditures. Real expenditu...
This paper studies the impact of binding term limits on voter turnout, analyzing the Portuguese exp...
Since the late 20th century, numerous Latin American nations have launched efforts to expand term li...
We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimat...
Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting auto...
1We thank seminar participants at MIT for helpful comments. Professor Ansolabehere wishes to thank t...
Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting auto...
We evaluate the e¤ects of the duration of legislative terms on the performance of legislators. Causa...
In developed democracies, incumbents are consistently found to have an electoral advantage over thei...
Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting auto...
Building on models of electoral competition with reputational mechanisms, I show that term limits de...