Japanese intelligence and imperial diplomacy in 1920s China

This study examines three cases, the First Zhili-Fengtian War of 1922, Second Zhili-Fengtian War of 1924, and Guo Songling Revolt of 1925 from an intelligence perspective to see them as something more than a simple path to the 1931 Manchurian Incident. Past scholarship has highlighted institutional rivalry over China policy between the Japanese Foreign and War Ministries, and a consequent mismatch between words and deeds in Japanese diplomacy. This study argues that Japanese civilian and military rivalries have been overplayed and that the so-called dual diplomacy of contrasting words and deeds was painstakingly learned as requisite for great power status. From a larger perspective, the case studies demonstrate that intelligence activities had become a common tool for great powers in interwar China and that Japanese intelligence became quite successful in this competitive environment