Directed search and optimal production

This dissertation consists of two essays concerning search theory. In the first essay we consider a model of directed search in which strategic sellers advertise general trading mechanisms. A mechanism determines the number of buyers that will get served and the side payments as a function of ex post realized demand. After observing these advertisements buyers simultaneously visit exactly one seller. Each buyer\u27s expected utility depends on the visiting decisions of other buyers. This dependence becomes especially interesting since the buyers cannot coordinate their visiting strategies. Despite the presence of strategic interaction among the sellers all symmetric equilibria are constrained efficient but not payoff equivalent. Therefore, authorities should intervene in this type of market to redistribute surplus and not to improve efficiency. As markets grow infinitely large all equilibria yield the same profit. For the large market case we provide conditions under which only a very simple class of mechanisms is posted in equilibrium. The purpose of the second essay is to link inflation generated by expansionary monetary policy and asset prices. We study the properties of a monetary model in which a real asset is valued for its rate of return and for its liquidity. Money is essential if and only if real assets are scarce, in the precise sense that their supply is not sufficient to satisfy the demand for liquidity. Our model generates a clear connection between asset prices and monetary policy. When money grows at a higher rate, inflation is higher and the return on money decreases. In equilibrium, no arbitrage amounts to equating the real return of both objects. Therefore, the price of the asset increases in order to lower its real return. This negative relationship between inflation and asset returns is in the spirit of research in finance initiated in the early 80\u27s