THE PLACE OF NORMATIVE AND INTENTIONAL DISCOURSES IN QUINE\u27S NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY

Quine claims that his naturalized epistemology which is a science about science must take the place of traditional epistemology. Because physics is the paradigm of science for Quine, there is apparently no room for normative and intentional discourses in Quine\u27s naturalized epistemology. However, Quine uses normative and intentional discourses in his naturalized epistemological inquiry. Hence, the problem addressed in this dissertation is the place of normative and intentional discourses in Quine\u27s naturalized epistemology. My procedure is to examine critically the above mentioned contradiction from two different angles. In an initial and external criticism I assume the in-principle gap between physicalistic discourse and normative and intentional discourses. In an internal criticism I assume the gap merely practical. In the former criticism I offer my own interpretation of the status of naturalized epistemology in Quine\u27s philosophy and argue for the presence of a tension between methodological concerns and what Quine calls his physicalistic bias. I explain three manifestations of the tension in Quine\u27s writings: his discussions of language acquisition, induction and scientific method in general. I also argue that methodological concerns play the ineradicable role in an epistemology, which Quine must and at least partially does recognize. In the internal criticism I discuss the nature of the gap between physicalistic discourse and normative and intentional discourses and examine and criticize Quine\u27s behavioristic physicialism. On the basis of the criticism of Quine\u27s behavioristic physicalism I criticize Quine\u27s thesis of indeterminacy of translation which denies the fact of the matter for intentional discourse. I find, as a result, that because both methodological concerns and physicalistic bias are basic elements of Quine\u27s naturalized epistemology, the resultant tension is serious. I also find that Quine\u27s naturalized epistemology as it is cannot resolve the tension, whether we assume the gap as in-principle or merely practical. Thus, I conclude that as the unsettling status of normative and intentional discourses indicates, Quine\u27s naturalized epistemology does not make a coherent whole