OBJECTIVITY, LOGIC, AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF SCIENCE: THE CASE OF CARNAP\u27S THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (LOGICAL POSITIVISM, FOUNDATIONALISM, VIENNA CIRCLE, UNITY OF SCIENCE, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY)

Rudolf Carnap\u27s The Logical Structure of The World (Aufbau) remains the most sustained and detailed attempt to convert logico-mathematical procedures to use in empirical and scientific discourse. Moreover, the failure of Carnap\u27s attempts to apply logic to empirical and scientific discourse is central to the legacy of metaphysical projects and epistemological programs that constitutes Contemporary Analytic philosophy. Contemporary assessments of logical positivism identify Carnap\u27s Aufbau endeavors as empiricist in conception by focussing on the verification and testability of empirical and scientific theories. I argue for a Kantian interpretation of the Aufbau, and thereby offer a different picture of Carnap\u27s conception of the justification of empirical and scientific knowledge. On a Kantian interpretation of the Aufbau, justification would be provided in terms of the systematizability of empirical and scientific knowledge which is presupposed by the rationality of empirical and scientific discourse. My Kantian interpretation is advanced by an analysis of the role of logic in the Aufbau. Our present understanding of the Aufbau\u27s logic is determined by W. V. Quine, on the one hand, and Nelson Goodman, on the other. Goodman and Quine fault the Aufbau for its inability to effect the logical translation of empirical and scientific discourse. I respond to both Quine\u27s (Chapter 1) and Goodman\u27s (Chapter 3) objections on behalf of the point of view established by Carnap in the Aufbau. On the basis of the view established in chapter 3, I then articulate a theory of judgment previously unnoticed in Carnap\u27s Aufbau enterprise (Chapter 4). I argue that though Carnap\u27s employment of logic presupposes this theory of judgment, the Aufbau cannot sustain the epistemological apparatus it requires. To this end, I introduce Kant\u27s account of the role of Reason and the concept of systematic unity in his theory of judgment (Chapter 5), and apply them both to Carnap\u27s use of logic in the Aufbau. I conclude that the justification of empirical and scientific knowledge advanced in the Aufbau can best be appreciated in terms of Kant\u27s conception of transcendental logic which, on our view, is not logic at all. Thus Carnap\u27s efforts in the Aufbau do not constitute the kind of advance in clarity and precision we have learned to associate with the origins of Analytic philosophy